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The State responds as follows to the arguments raised in Defendant's brief.
Reply to Point LA
DEFENDANT MISSTATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
BINDOVER STANDARD
Defendant asserts that a magistrate's probable c^use determination at
preliminary hearing, while reviewed for correctness, is afforded "great discretion."
Br. Aple. 2 (quoting State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 14, 48 PJ3d 872). Defendant is
mistaken regarding the discretion to be afforded a magistrate's bindover decision.
As the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held, a magistrates discretion in making
a bindover determination is not great, but "limited/' State p., Virgin, 2006 UT 29, |T[
23-24, 31-34,137 P.3d 787. A magistrate's "discretion is limited . . . because in the
bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is
limited." Id. at 1f 34.

Defendant's mistake comes from his reliance on Norris. While Norris dealt
with a magistrate's probable cause determination, it did so not in the context of a
preliminary hearing, but in the context of a search warrant. See Norris, 2001 UT 104,
Tf 14. In the search warrant or suppression context, unlike the bindover context, a
magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is not limited. See State v.
Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, If 15, 227 P.3d 271 (in suppression context, because '"a
district court is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh
the evidence, the court of appeals may not substitute its judgment as to a factual
question unless the district court's finding is clearly erroneous'") (citation omitted).
Thus, a magistrate's probable cause determination for a search warrant is
necessarily afforded more discretion than in the bindover context. See Virgin, 2006
UT 29, | 34.
Defendant also erroneously states that "the magistrate was free to draw his
own inferences from [the facts], and not necessarily in a light most favorable to the
prosecution." Br. Aple. 4 n.3. But, as explained in the State's opening brief, it is
well-settled that a magistrate "must view all evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
prosecution." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, If 10, 20 P.3d 300 (emphasis added).
Moreover, when there are competing reasonable inferences, the magistrate is
2

obligated to choose those inferences that support the prosecution's case. See id. at ^f
20. Thus, contrary to Defendant's claim, the magistrate was "necessarily" required
not only to view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, but
also to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.
Defendant also suggests that a magistrate is "within his or her discretion to
make credibility determinations in regard to the evidence, and may discount or
disregard evidence that does not support a reasonable belief as to an element of the
charges." Br. Aple. 6 (citing State v. Ingram, 2006 UT App 237, f 19,139 P.3d 286).
Defendant overstates the discretion afforded magistrates to make credibility
determinations at a preliminary hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained,
a magistrate's "evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is limited to
determining that 'evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Virgin, 2006 UT 29,
If 24 (quoting State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)) (alteration in original).
"It is inappropriate for a magistrate to weigh credible but conflicting evidence at
preliminary hearing as a preliminary hearing 'is not a trial on the merits' but 'a
gateway to the finder of fact.'"

Id. (quoting Talbot, 972 f.ld

at 438). Rather,

"magistrates must leave all the weighing of credible but conflicting evidence to the
trier of fact and must 'view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
3

prosecution[,] resolv[ing] all inferences in favor of the prosecution/" Id. (citation
omitted) (alterations in Virgin).
Reply to Point LB.
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE PROSECUTION AND DRAWING ALL REASONABLE
INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION, SUPPORTS A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE
CONTRABAND
Defendant essentially argues that the preliminary hearing evidence did not
support a reasonable inference that he "constructively possessed" the contraband,
because it did not show that he had "exclusive control" of his motel room. Br. Aple.
8. Defendant's argument, however, like the magistrate's ruling below, fails to view
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and to draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.
Defendant asserts that the State's only evidence supporting a nexus between
him and the contraband was that Defendant "had rented that motel room at some
point," but that there was no evidence "of when he rented that room, how long he
rented it for, who he rented it with, etc." Br. Aple. 9. Defendant further asserts that
an officer on cross-examination "conceded" that the room was not under the
"exclusive control of" Defendant. Id. at 8. Defendant reasons that since Defendant
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" was not the only person with access to the motel room," the State did not show that
the contraband belonged to him. Id. at 8-9.
Defendant's argument ignores much of the State's evidence and the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. First, contrary to Defendant's
claim, the only evidence regarding occupancy of the room was that Defendant lived
there alone. Defendant told officers he lived at the motel and gave them his room
number. See R41:12-13. Defendant invited the officers to search his room. R41:1213,15. By so doing, Defendant showed that he himself believed that the room was
his and that he continued to exercise authority and control over it. His conduct also
shows that he believed that the officers would find his room as he left it—with the
clean pipe in his bed, under some covers. R41:13. Officers also found paperwork
and a prescription bottle bearing Defendant's name. R41:20, 23. Officers found
nothing in the room identified as belonging to someone else. R41:23. Taken
together, this evidence leads to the reasonable inference that Defendant alone
occupied the room.
Defendant nevertheless asserts that "numerous people, including individuals
not associated with the motel, had ready access to the motel room." Br. Aple. 9. The
record does not bear out this claim. An officer did concede that the manager, who
had let police into the room, would have had prior access to the room; and the
5

officer "imagined" that the housekeeping staff also would have had access to the
room. R41:22-23. But no evidence suggested that "numerous" people or that
anyone not associated with the motel had access to the room without Defendant's
knowledge or permission. Indeed, the record citation Defendant relies on to make
this claim merely states that before talking to police, Defendant had asked a friend
of his to go to the room to find the pipe. Br. Aple. 9 (citing R41:6).
But the fact that others might have had access to Defendant's room does not
undercut the reasonable inference from the totality of the evidence that Defendant
was the person with the strongest factual nexus to the contraband: he lived alone in
the room where it was found, R41:12-13, 20-23; he continued to exercise authority
and control over the room by inviting police to search it, R41:12-13,15; he admitted
to having a drug problem, R41:16; he admitted to possessing other paraphernalia—a
clean pipe and a syringe—commonly used for ingesting illegal drugs, R41:16; police
found the pipe, undisturbed in Defendant's bed, where Defendant said it would be,
R41:13; and the contraband was found discarded in a garbage sack, R41:14,16-20.
Indeed, Defendant's and the magistrate's speculation that someone else might
have accessed the room and planted the contraband in Defendant's garbage sack is
unreasonable under the totality of the evidence. As explained in the State's opening
brief, nothing in the evidence suggests a reason why someone other than Defendant
6

would have taken the trouble to place the contraband in a garbage sack in a room
occupied solely by Defendant. And, presumably, if housekeeping had accessed the
room, the garbage sack would have been removed.
Defendant asserts that because he told police that he "iftjected drugs and did
not smoke them," his admissions cannot support "an inferente that [he] possessed
drugs and paraphernalia designed to be smoked, even when viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution/' Br. Aple. 9-10. Defendant's charges, however, were
based on methamphetamine residue in the baggie and on the tube straw, not on the
clean pipe. R36-37; R41:38-39. Thus, nothing in the evidence suggests that the
methamphetamine was designed to be smoked as opposed to being injected. But,
more importantly, the evidence must be viewed in the light imost favorable to the
prosecution in its entirety.

As explained in the State's opening brief, in a

constructive possession case, the required nexus may be established by means of
several different factors, including, where appropriate "previbus drug use/7 State v.
Workman, 2005 UT 66, | 32, 122 P.3d 639. Thus, Defendant's incriminating
admissions—including his drug abuse—together with the discovery of the
contraband in a garbage sack in his living quarters, give rise to a reasonable belief
that the contraband belonged to Defendant.

7

In short, even assuming that Defendant's and the magistrate's competing
inferences were reasonable, the magistrate was obligated to accept the inferences
that supported the prosecution's case and allow the case to go to a jury. See Clark,
2001 UT 9, | 20.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the dismissal of the charges and remand for the
magistrate to bind Defendant over to stand trial on the two charges.
Respectfully submitted August ^252010.
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Utah Attorney General
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'"Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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